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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIE PRICE and LAFE MORLEY, 
Plat'ntiffs .and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ASHBY'S INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, and GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, PONTIAC DIV., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9165 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts is incomplete and 
frequently misleading, makes assertions which are un-
supported by the record and includes material not ad-
mitted in evidence. Therefore, Defendant General Motors 
Corporation 1nakes the following Statement of Facts. 
The parties \Yill be designated as they appeared in the 
trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose out of an automobile accident which 
occurred April 28, 1958, at about 11:30 p.m. on Highway 
6-50, approximately two miles south of Delta, Utah. 
The automobile in which Plaintiffs were riding failed 
to negotiate a turn, left the highway and turned over. 
Plaintiffs brought suit for damages allegedly suffered 
as a result. Trial was held October 6, 1959 in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County before Aldon J. Anderson, 
District Judge, and at the close of Plaintiffs' evidence 
a Motion to Dismiss was granted as to each Defendant. 
Plaintiffs have appealed from the Order of Dismissal. 
Plaintiff Leslie Price purchased a Pontiac auto-
mobile on February 14, 1958, fron1 Defendant Ashby's 
Incorporated at Delta, Utah. The air suspension system 
functioned normally through the first 2,000 miles of 
the autmnobile's operation. (R. 3±). Smnetin1e later 
Price observed that after the engine had been stopped 
for a considerable period of time, he would find the 
automobile's right front near the ground. (R. 80). Some 
settling of the body was anticipated in the Owner's 
Instruction Manual and the owner was instructed to 
start the car engine to rectify this. (R. 14, Ex. P-1). 
After the engine on Price's car had been started, the 
car would return to its nonnal level in approxilnately 
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twenty ~e<·ond~ (R. 81) ancl while it was being driven 
there was no difficulty with the level or suspension of 
the body. (R. 81). Price took the automobile to De-
fendant Ashby's four times to have the air suspension 
system adjusted. (R. 80). After these adjustments the 
right front continued to settle after the engine had 
been stopped for a considerable period of time. (R. 
67, 80). 
Plaintiff Lafe Morley, a real estate salesman, visited 
Price in Delta on April 28, 1958. Price and Morley 
left Delta in Price's Pontiac at about 4:30 p.m. and 
drove to Garrison, Utah, about eighty miles from Delta. 
At Garrison they looked over a ranch which Morley 
was attempting to sell to Price (R. 40, 41), and then 
went to Baker, Nevada, where they had sandwiches and 
two Coke highballs. (R. -±-1:, 133). About 9:00 p.m. they 
started driving back to Delta. (R. 46). 
At a point about two miles south of Delta they 
failed to negotiate a curve to the left and the car rolled 
over. (R. 47). The only evidence of what caused the 
car to leave the road is the testimony of Plaintiffs. 
Price testified: 
"A. When we was making that turn, it happened 
so quick, it is kind of hard to explain. It 
seemed like the car stepped up, and was off 
and over." (R. -±G). 
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Morley testified: 
''A. I noticed we was getting close to home and 
all at once we just went upside down. I had 
time to say, 'Oh, my God, Les', that is all 
I got time to say. 
Q. Mr. Morley, did you observe the way the 
automobile moved~ 
A. There wasn't time enough. It was so fast 
I didn't observe a thing. It just started go-
ing over and we was upside down and was 
out." (R. 136, 137). 
Morley said this was the only observation he made about 
the accident prior to its happening. (R. 155). Neither 
Plaintiff recalled anything unusual about the automobile 
before the accident, Price stating: 
"Q. Do you recall immediately before the car 
going off the highway that the car was being 
rough riding~ 
A. No I didn't." (R. 76). 
On this point Morley said: 
"Q. Did you notice anything of an unusual nature 
about the auton1ohile, or how it operated 1 
A. Not a thing." (R. 134). 
Price testified that when he left Delta on the day of 
the accident the level of the rar was proper and re-
Inained so until after the accident. (R. 82). 
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Plaintiffs' Statmnent of Facts asserts that the steer-
ing wheel froze in Price's hand. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. ~). There is no reference to the record to support 
this assertion for the obvious reason that there was 
no such evidence. The smne is true of the assertion that 
the car swayed prior to the accident. 
The day after the accident, Plaintiffs returned to 
the scene looking for :Morley's glasses. (R. 51). Price 
observed the scene at that time and stated: 
•· A. Just as ''"e come around the bend there, I 
could see brake 1narks on the oil and the 
car just went straight and down over the 
shoulder." (R. 51). 
Price saw only the brake 1narks on the highway and 
did not see any gouges in the road. (R. 75). M.:orley said 
the only mark he observed at the scene was a scuff 
mark which was not on the roadway at all. His testi-
mony was: 
"Q. Now, this scuff mark that you testified to, 
that scuff mark was off to the shoulder of 
the road, wasn't it? 
~-l. Yes sir, it was in the dirt. 
Q. It wasn't in the oil surface of the road? 
A. That is right." (R. 151). 
The autmnobile was taken to Salt Lake City for 
repairs at Fred A. Carleson Cmnpany. The right side 
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was smashed and the right front wheel bent back. (R. 
53, 87). The right front was repaired by Milo Solomon. 
He described the car as "pretty well bent up on the 
right front." (R. 87). In the course of repairing the 
front suspension system Solomon found a very small 
hole in the air line leading from the air reservoir tank 
to the manual override valve. (R. 104, Ex. P -2). He had 
to use soap suds on the line to locate the hole (R. 104) 
near the upper control arm. He was of the opinion that 
the control arm had rubbed a hole in the air line. (R. 92). 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts is misleading regard-
Ing Solmnon's testimony. (Brief of Appellant p. 6, 7). 
By implication Plaintiffs atten1pt to attribute to Solo-
mon the status of an expert on the air suspension system 
of Pontiac automobiles. After reciting his experience 
as a mechanic, Plaintiffs state: "On no other Pontiac 
had Solomon ever seen the line so close to the control 
arm." (Id. p. 6). The same assertion is repeated later. 
(Id. p. 7). Such statement n1eans absolutely nothing 
since Solomon testified that this was the only Pontiac 
air suspension system he had ever encountered. He 
testified: 
"Q. Over the time you have worked since they 
came out, since 1958, ho:w 1nany have you had 
occasion to work on~ 
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~\. I have never worked on one other than align-
ing, you have reference to aligning or work-
ing on one~ 
Q. Working on one. 
A. I haven't ·worked on any other one, this is 
the only one I repaired. 
Q. Before you undertook to repair this, did you 
receive instructions how to repair~ 
A. No sir." (R. 101). 
Later Solomon said : 
"Q. In connection with the front suspension your 
fmniliarity is, I take it, with the general lo-
cation of the line? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And not with the precise position of where 
the lines are supposed to go according to 
the design of the General Motors engineers, 
that is correct, you are not familiar with that~ 
A. Well, from memory no, I couldn't tell you 
exactly where they should fit in." (R. 105). 
On redirect examination, he said : 
''Q. His question was a little broader, are you 
familiar with where those lines are located 
on other Pontiacs other than Leslie Price's ~ 
A. Well, I have never looked at them if that 
will answer your question." (R. 107, 108). 
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Solomon acknowledged that in talking about the position 
of this line the space involved is less than an inch. (R. 
109). In fact, counsel for Plaintiffs acknowledged that 
Solomon was not an expert when in arguing his motion 
toreopen, he stated: 
"At the time Mr. Solomon was on the witness 
stand it was revealed, and also by questions di-
rected by the plaintiff to qualify him as an ex-
pert, he was not qualified as an expert. That 
this Pontiac was the only Pontiac he had ever 
worked on and this air suspension was the only 
one he had repaired on a Star Chief ... " (R. 230). 
After determining that Solomon was not qualified 
to testify as an expert, Plailltiffs called Stanley Ren-
shaw, an employee of the Pontiac l\1otor Division of 
General Motors. Renshaw testfied that the suspension 
system was equipped with an exhaust line and that a 
hissing sound was normal in the car's operation when 
passengers got out of the car. (R. 196). With respect 
to the effect on the air pressure of a hole in the line, 
he said: 
"Q. l\1r. Renshaw, are you telling us the air 
compressor operates to maintain a constant 
pressure into this tank and in this line~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. If you had a sn1all hole the air compressor 
would stabilize even though there was some 
air leaking away~ 
A. Yes." (R. 194). 
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If a ear is down when the engine is stopped and then 
eomes up within twenty seconds after starting of the 
engine, Renshaw stated that any hole in the system 
would necessarily be negligible in size. (R. 211). 
Renshaw said that the front wheels were not regu-
lated individually but that the T valve maintained a 
constant pressure between the two. (R. 197). The result 
of this is a leveling effect between the wheels. (R. 197). 
Even if all the air in the system were exhausted, the 
car would rest on c01npression bumpers and would still 
have road clearance. (R. 130, 209, 210). 
Plaintiffs' Staten1ent of Facts includes reference 
to proposed Exhibit P-3, a Pontiac Shop Manual. (Brief 
of Appellants, p. 8, 9). This material would seem to be 
improperly included in Plaintiffs' Brief since it appears 
fr01n the record that proposed Exhibit P-3 was never 
admitted in evidence. (R. 21). The Court's ruling on 
this question is not entirely clear. At trial, counsel for 
Plaintiffs attempted to use the 11:anual for purposes of 
examination of Renshaw and was not permitted to do 
so. After resting their case, Plaintiffs moved to reopen, 
making a proffer of evidence that included reference 
to proposed Exhibit P -3. Regarding this, the Court said: 
"I think if the circumstances are ·such -
whether or not counsel should be permitted the 
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right to reopen - that the Court should grant 
that right to reopen, and if the only question in-
volved was whether or not there was material 
proffered and having relevancy, that the ruling 
of the ·Court would be, while somewhat remote, 
as much a part of the picture as much of the 
evidence that has been presented to explain how 
the system operates so inferences might be drawn 
what effect, if a failure, such a leak will have, -
that will be of assistance to you, :Mr. King .... 
Do you want to dissect this~ (refers to ex-
hibit). 
Mr. King : This is part of the record. 
The Court: It is part of the record? 
Mr. Hanson: It has not been received. 
The Court : Is there any way to identify it 1 
Mr. King: I identified it by page. 
Mr. Hanson: You said the n1otion was granted 
to each of the Defendants? 
The Court: Yes." (R. 233, 234). 
The Exhibit sheet indicates proposed Exhibit P-3 was 
not received in evidence. (R. 21). 
If this exhibit was adn1itted in evidence by the 
Court, it was admitted erroneously. Page 3 A-33 of 
proposed Exhibit P-3, referred to by Plaintiffs, deals 
specifically with "TmYing Air Suspension Car." (R. 
229). The exhibit does not relate to any circumstances 
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present in this case. Counsel for Defendant General 
:Motors Corporation objected to this exhibit on the 
ground it was irrelevant and ilnmaterial and outside 
the issues of the case. (R. 231). It is obvious that the 
proposed exhibit has no tendency to illuminate any 
issue involved in this case. 
After hearing Plaintiffs' proffer of evidence in 
support of their :Motion to Reopen, the Court granted a 
~lotion to Dismiss as to each Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THA1T THE AL-
LEGED DEFECT IN THE AIR SUSPENSION SYSTEM, IF 
IT EXISTED, WAS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ALLEGED DE-
FECT IN THE AIR SUSPENSION SYSTEM ·CAUSED THE 




PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THA'T THE AL-
LEGED DEFECT IN THE AIR SUSPENSION SYSTEM, IF 
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IT EXISTED, WAS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. 
Plaintiffs claim that the air suspension system on 
the Price automobile was defective in that a line was 
installed in such a manner that the upper control arm 
rubbed against it causing a hole in the line from which 
the air in the system escaped. There is, of course, no 
direct evidence that the line was installed by General 
Motors in such a position that it was rubbed by the 
upper control arm. 
Under the rule of Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955), Plaintiffs failed 
to establish that Defendant General Motors Corporation 
was negligent. To find a n1anufacturer negligent in the 
production of an instrumentality in which a defect sub-
sequently appears, it Inust be proven either directly or 
by inference that the defect existed at the time the 
instrumentality left the n1anufacturer's control. To prove 
this by inference, the Hewitt case requires that the 
Plaintiff exclude every reasonable possibility except that 
the defect existed when it left the n1anufacturer's hand. 
To meet this burden a plaintiff n1ust exclude every rea-
sonable hypothesis that a third person 1nay have caused 
the clanned defect. 
It is obvious that Plaintiffs' evidence here does not 
exclude the reasonable possibility that the alleged defect 
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was caused by the work clone at Ashby's. Indeed, it 
would appear to be 1nore likely that the alleged defect 
was caused b~· Ashby's. Price admitted that after pur-
chasing the aut01nobile he took it to Ashby's on four 
different occasions to have the air suspension system 
worked on. (R. 80). This, of course, was before the acci-
dent and before the hole was discovered. There was 
evidence available regarding what was done at Ashby's, 
but Plaintiffs failed to produce the mechanic who worked 
on the car to testify whether or not he had changed 
the location of the air line with respect to the upper 
control ann. The nan1e of this mechanic, Jay Fullmer, 
was known to Plaintiffs. (R. 66). 
Any finding as to ,,·hose negligence caused the 
defect complained of here would have to be based upon 
one of at least two equally probable inferences, first, 
that the air line was placed too close to the upper control 
ann by General Motors, or, second, that Ashby's in 
working on the system placed the air line too close to 
the upper control arm. It was Plaintiffs' burden as to 
Generall\Iotors to exclude the inference that the alleged 
defect could have been caused by Ashby's. In failing 
to do this, Plaintiffs have failed to establish negligence 
on the part of Defendant General Motors under the 
Hen·itt case. 
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Plaintiffs contend that the settling of the right front 
of the car is evidence of negligent placement of the air 
line. Such settling, however, is 1nechanically impossible 
under the evidence. Solomon testifed that he found a 
very small hole in the line between the reservoir tank 
and the manual override valve. (R. 89, 104, Ex. P-2). 
After the air leaves the reservoir tank it passes the 
point at which the hole was found and enters the manual 
override valve from which it is distributed to all four 
air springs. (R. 195, Ex. P-2). The air for the front 
air springs goes through a height control valve and a 
T valve (R. 195, Ex. P -2), the T valve maintaining con-
stant pressure between the two front air springs. (R. 
197, 198, 199). It is obvious from the explanation given 
by the expert witness Rensha-v{ that a leak at the point 
claimed by Plaintiffs would not cause the right front 
of ,the body of the automobile to settle alone. 
If this leak had existed prior to the accident, the 
result would have been that the entire body would have 
settled unifor1nly, since the available air V{ould have 
been distributed equally to the wheels. The only reason-
able inference that can be drawn frmn these facts is 
that the hole cmnplained of had nothing whatever to 
do with the clai1ned settling of the right front. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ALLEGED DE-
FECT IN THE AIR SUSPENSION SYSTEM ·CAUSED THE 
PLAINTIFFS' AUTOMOBILE TO LEAVE THE HIGHWAY 
AND OVERTURN. 
Plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to prove that 
the hole in the air line caused the Price automobile to 
leave the highway and overturn. Although the facts 
relating to this point are clear, Plaintiffs have attempted 
to formulate a theory that the air suspension system 
leaked, causing the body of the car to settle, causing a 
portion of the car to drag, throwing it off the highway. 
Plaintiffs' own testimony destroys this theory. Price 
testified: 
"Q. Relate what happened when you came near 
Delta~ 
A. vVhen we was Inaking that turn, it happened 
so quick, it is kind of hard to explain. It 
seemed like the car stepped up and was off 
and over. (R. 46). 
* * * * 
Q. Will you tell how this felt to you immediately 
before you left the road and you turned over~ 
A. I didn't have much of a chance to feel any-
thing. In driving with power steering you 
sort of relax. I didn't have time to put much 
pressure on the ·wheel." (R. 47, 48). 
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Morley's testimony was similar. lie said: 
"Q. ·Tell what you observed, what the situation 
was, tell us what happened~ 
A. I noticed we was getting cose to home and 
all at once we just went upside down. I had 
time to say 'Oh, my God, Les.' That is all I 
got time to say. 
Q. Mr. :M~orley, did you observe the way the au-
tomobile moved~ 
A. There wasn't time enough. It was so fast I 
didn't observe a thing. It just started going 
over and we was upside down and was out." 
(R. 136, 137). 
He made no other observations regarding the operation 
of the automobile prior to the accident. (R. 155). 
Neither Plaintiff testified that the car seemed to 
settle nor that any portion of the car dragged. On the 
contrary, Price testified: 
"Q. When you left Delta the day of this accident, 
April 28, 1958, the level of that car was 
proper~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. It stayed that way until after the accident1 
A. Yes." (R. 82). (En1phasis added.) 
Referring to the ti1ne innnediately preceding the ac-
cident, Price said : 
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"Q. Do you recall inunediately before the car 
going off the highway that the car was being 
rough riding~ 
A. No I didn't." (R. 76). 
Morley confirmed the fact that the car was normal in 
its operation, saying: 
"Q. Did you notice anything of an unusual na-
ture about the automobile, or how it oper-
ated? 
A. Not a thing." (R. 134). 
Price admitted that while he was driving the car 
he had no trouble with the level of the body at all (R. 
81, 82) and that the only time he had trouble with the 
level was after the car had been standing without the 
engine running for some considerable time. (R. 80). 
Plaintiffs recalled clearly the events that occurred 
on the day of the accident. Certainly if the suspension 
system had failed and permitted the body of the car 
to drag in spite of the "compressor bumpers", they would 
have recalled this also. Plaintiffs rely heavily on a 
scuff mark on the highway to support their theory that 
a portion of the car dragged. Howover, again Plaintiffs' 
own state1nents are contrary to this theory. Price testi-
fied that upon returning to the scene of the accident the 
following day, he could see the brake 1narks on the 
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highway, but saw no gouges on the surface of the high-
way. (R. 51, 75). On cross-examination, Morley admitted 
that the scuff mark he saw was completely off the sur-
face of the highway. (R. 151). 
The record affirmatively shows that no dragging 
occurred until after the automobile left the highway. 
This record cannot possibly support a finding that the 
cause of the accident was a dragging of the car on the 
highway caused by a failure of the air suspension sys-
tem. On the contrary, Renshaw's testimony that a small 
hole in the air line would be compensated for by the 
air compressor and would not affect the operation of 
the system (R. 194) and Solomon's characterization of 
the hole as "very small" (R. 104, 92, 89) requiring the 
use of soap suds to locate it (R. 104) negate Plaintiffs' 
contention that the hole was so large that it dissipated 
the air from the system. 
Utah law is clear on the question of causation. The 
cases of Hooper v. General 111 otors Corporation} 123 
Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549, (1953), Northern v. General 
JJ1.otors Corporation} 2 Utah 2d 9, 268 P.2d 981, (195±), 
and Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co.} 3 Utah 2d 
354, 284 P .2d 471, ( 1955), all stand for the principle 
that to prevail a plaintiff n1ust shm'T that the defect 
complained of caused the da1nage. Here there is abso-
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lutely no evidence that the hole complained of had any 
causal relation to the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trend of modern decisions facilitates 
proof of claims, the necessity of some evidence in sup-
port of the claim asserted is still a part of our law. 
Until proof of negligence and causation becomes merely 
an unnecessary obstacle to an award of damages and 
liability rests on injury alone, cases such as this cannot 
properly be submitted to juries. 
The trial court in dismissing this action at the end 
of the Plaintiffs' case acted in the only way possible 
under the evidence and the lack thereof. Its judgment 
should, therefore, be affinned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN and JOHN F. 
PIER·CEY 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Responde11t 
General ~Iotors Corporation, 
Pontiac Division 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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